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Tn general, research on the impact ()j6ilprice shocks on the U.S.
economy has assumed that oil price changes are exogenous - deter-
minedalmostexclusively by the actions ofOPEC. This paper uses vector
autoregressions to demonstrate that the foreign exchange value ofthe
dollar has a substantial impact on the price ofoil. Thus, the practice of
using changes in the dollar price ofoil as a measure ofthe underlying
supply shocks is likely to exaggerate the effects ofexogenous oil price
changes.
Research on the effects of oil supply shocks on
the United States' economy has assumed that
changes in the price of oil are exogenous, deter-
mined largely by the actions ofOPEC. Significant
historicalepisodes seemto supportthis assumption.
For instance, oil prices. approximately tripled in
both 1973 and 1979 as a result ofOPEC's decision
to curtail the supply of oil. This assumption of
exogeneityis critical, becauseitpermits researchers
to associate changes in the price ofoil with shocks
to its supply. Researchers can then determine the
effects of a shock to the supply of oil simply by
looking at the response ofthe economy to a change
inthe price ofoil.
Inthispaper, we demonstratethatitis incorrectto
treat all changes in the dollar price of oil as
exogenous. More specifically, we show that the
foreign exchange value ofthe dollar has a substan-
tial impact on the dollarprice ofoil. This result has
important implications. First, exclusion of the
exchange rate in any study of the impact of oil
supplyshocks will leadto incorrectestimates ofthe
effect of oil price changes on the economy since
someofthe effectsofexchangerate changes will be
attributed to oil price changes. Second, the exis-
tence ofexchange rate effects implies that changes
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in the price ofoil cannot always be associated with
exogenous supply shocks but must be recognized as
the result ofa mix offactors. Thus, changes in the
price of oil should not be used as a measure of
supply shocks.
We examine these issues using a statistical tech-
niqueknown as vectorautoregressions (VARs). This
approach is "atheoretical" in the sense that it does
not use economic theory to impose any restrictions
upon how different variables should interact with
one another. In addition, it treats all variables as
determined within the system itself - a feature
whose importance will be evident below. This tech-
nique is well-suited for the issues at hand because
shocks to oil supply affect the economy through
several channels (see the discussion in Section II).
Because ofthemultiplicity ofchannels and the lack
ofprior knowledge about their relative importance,
the more conventional technique ofplacing specific
restrictions upon the ways that a supply shock will
affect the economy is likely to distort the empirical
results.
A number of previous empirical studies have
examinedtherelationship betweenoilpricechanges
andtheU.S. economyusingVARs butnoneofthem
take the exchange rate into account. 1 For instance,
Hamilton (1983) showed that the price of oil has
predictive power for real GNP, the GNPdeftator,
and a hostofothervariables, butthattheoil price isnot affected by them. His results suggest that oil
price changes are determined by considerations
external to the U.S. economy, and that oil price
increases have contributed significantly to business
cycles in the U.S. in the post World War II
period.2,3 Burbidge and Harrison (1984) also pre-
sent evidence supporting the view that oil prices
have had a significant impact upon both industrial
productionandtheconsumerpriceindex in the U.S.
Below, we present some empirical evidence on
this issue. Section I focuses on the relationship
between the exchange rate and the price of oil. It
contains adiscussion ofwhy changes in the value of
the dollar will have an effect on the price ofoil, as
well as some empirical tests of this relationship,
Section II then demonstrates how the measured
impactofoil price changes on the U,S. economy is
sensitive to the inclusion ofexchange rates. In that
section, we first discuss what economic theory tells
us about the impact of oil price shocks on the
economy and what the historical experience has
been in terms of both oil supply shocks and
exchange rate changes. Empirical results follow.




will discover that the price of oil in terms of their
own currencies has declined. Consequently there
will be acontraction in the quantity ofoilsuppliedat
the prevailing dollar price.4 In the diagram above,
this is shown as a leftward shift in the supply curve
for oil. To equate demand and supply, the dollar
price ofoil will then increase from Po to Pl' In the
same way, increases in the value ofthe dollar would
setinto motion declines in the dollar price of oil.
There are, ofcourse, other factors that determine
the price ofoil. The ability ofthe members ofOPEC
to act in concert was the primary reason that oil
prices approximately tripled in both 1973 and in
I. The Dollar and Oil Prices
The Effect of a
Decline in the Value of the
Dollar on the Price of Oil
Crude oil traded in world markets is priced in
dollars, This fact has important implications for the
relationship between the value ofthe dollar and the
price ofoil becauseoil importers who do not use the
dollar as currency must, in effect, obtain dollars to
purchase oil. Thus, if the value of the dollar
changes, the price they pay in terms of their own
currencies will change. For similar reasons, oil
exporters will also not be indifferent to fluctuations
in the value of the dollar.
To understand the way in which a change in the
value ofthe dollar affects the price ofoil, consider
the figure below. Assume that the curve labeled Do
represents the demand for oil by the oil importers
and the curve labeled So represents oil supply. The
world market for oil is then at equilibrium when the
price of oil is $Poper barrel.
Now suppose that the dollar falls in value against
the currencies of other oil-importing nations and
against the currencies of the oil exporters. If the
dollarprice ofoil remains unchanged, the otheroil-
importing countries will find that the price ofoil in
terms of their own currencies has declined. Conse-
quently, theirconsumptionofoil will go up. In terms
of the diagram, the demand curve for oil will
shift to the right. It is worth pointing out that this
increase in demand at an unchanged dollar price
occurs only because oil is priced in dollars. If oil
were priced in yen, for instance, a decrease in the
value ofthe dollar would actually lead to a decrease
in the U.S. demand for oil. The demand for oil by
otheroil-importingcountries would not be affected.
A change in the value of the dollar affects the
supply ofoil as well. Ifthe dollar falls, oil exporters
261979. Theprecedingdiscussion i~notmeantto deny
a role to OPEC, but to pointoutarole for the dollar.
Forinstance, it isdifficultto believethatOPECdoes
not take the value of the dollar into account when
setting the dollar price ofoil.
The discussion above has shown how changes in
the value ofthe dollar affect the price ofoil. While
we have not discussed what factors influence the
value ofthe dollar itself, this should not be taken to
imply that the dollar is immune to developments in
the U.S. and the restofthe world. Infact, the dollar
reacts to factors such as differences in the rate of
inflation betweenthe U.S. andthe restofthe world,
interest rate differentials, and shocks to productiv-
ity. For example, many economists contend that an
important reason for the depreciation of the dollar
during the two periods 1971-72 and 1978-79 was
the relatively loose monetary policy being followed
by the U.S. during those years.
The Empirical Relationship
We now present some empirical evidence on the
relationship between the dollar and the price of oil.
We use the multilateral trade-weighted nominal
exchange rate constructed by the Federal Reserve
Board as ourproxy for the value ofthe dollar. 5 This
is not the precise empirical counterpart to the
exchange rate in the discussion above. The
exchange rate relevant to world oil demand would
perhaps be one that used oil imports as weights.
However, the data necessary to construct such an
index is not readily available. Moreover, our results
may notbe very sensitive to the choice of index.6
Consequently, the trade-weighted exchange rate is
used here.
The measure of the oil price is the crude
petroleum component of the producer price index.
This measure is probably the most relevant to both
real activity and inflation in the U.S. Both the
exchange rate and the oil price measures have also
been widely used in previous research on the U.S.
economy.
Before examining the statistical relationship
between oil prices and exchange rates, it seems
useful to look athow the two variables have behaved
over our sample period. Chart 1 shows the relation-
Oil Price ...
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272829ship between the growth rate ofthe oil price and the
exchange rate using quarterly data from the second
quarterof1956 to the fourth quarterof1985. Three-
quartermoving averages have been used in the chart
to smooth out fluctuations.
The chart shows that the price of oil was much
more stable in the fixed exchange rate periodthan in
the floating exchange rate period. Growth rates of
boththeexchangerate andthepriceofoilwere close
to zero prior to 1970 but have been much more
volatile since then. In addition, both periods of
extended drops in the dollar (approximately the
periods 1970-73 and 1977-79 in the chart) were
followed by substantial increases in the price ofoil
- the two oil price"shocks" - while the apprecia-
tion ofthe dollar in the first half ofthe eighties has
been accompanied by falling oil prices. This pattern
of co-movement between these two variables is
30what the analysis above would suggest.
The increase in the volatility ofoil prices in the
floating rate erais one piece ofevidence supporting
our hypothesis. Stronger confirmation is provided
by·the fact that periods ofdollar depreciation have
bee.u followed by increases in the dollarprice ofoil,
while an appreciation of the dollar has been fol-
lowed by decreases in the dollar price ofoil.
Results from VARs
We now employ VARs to present some formal
evidence for our hypothesis.? The results of the
estimation are in Table lAo They reveal that the
exchange rate has predictive power for the price of
oil, while the oil price is not very useful in predict-
ingexchangerates. Approximately halfofthe varia-
tioninoilprices is unpredictable onthe basisofpast
values ofthe exchange rate and the price ofoil.
Chart 2 transforms the VARs in Table lA and
shows how exchange rates and oil prices react over
time to a disturbance that could not have been
predicted on the basis oftheir past values. The right
hand panel, for instance, shows how the exchange
rate reacts to a disturbance in the price ofoil. One
example of such a disturbance would be the Iran-
Iraq war. The disturbances actually used in Chart 2
have been set equal to the standard deviation ofthe
disturbances in each variable over the sample
period. Thus, the plots represent the dynamic
responses of each ofthe two variables to an "aver-
age" disturbance in the other variable.
The charts reveal that an unpredicted increase in
the value ofthe dollar leads to a decline intheprice
ofoil with a lag ofapproximately two quarters. The
price of oil remains low for about three years after
the shock, after which the response damps out. By
contrast, the response of the exchange rate to a
shock to the price ofoil is relatively weak, although
the dollar does show some evidence of apprecia-
tion.8
The evidence in Table lA and Chart 2 demon-
strates that changes in the dollar's value have a
statistically significant impact on the dollar price of
oil, and that an increase in the value of the dollar
leads to a decline inthedollarpriceofoil. However,
the results do not rule out the possibility that
exchange-rate-induced changes in the price of oil
constitute only a small proportion ofthe total varia-
Chart 2
Dynamic Responses
(Obtained from VARs in Table 1)
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o 8tioninthepriceofoilover the sample period. To
eXamine this issue, considerthe results inTable 1B.
Disturbances .to •the exchange rate account for a
progressively greater proportion of the variance of
theerfoririforecastirigtheprice of oil. At the
twenty-quarter horizon, for instance, exchange rate
disturbancesaccount for 42 percent of the forecast
errpr "arian~~?f?ilprice~.9Theseresultsimplythat
shock.s tothe exchange rate have been an important
sourceof'variationsin the price of oil over the
sample period.
Sin.ceexchange rate changes account for a sub-
stantialproportionofthe changes in oil prices over
the periodsampled, itis natural to wonder aboutthe
role played by exchange rate changes during par-
ticular episodes within the period. More specifi-
cally, how much ofthe two oil price shocks of the
1970s can be predicted on the basis ofpast changes
in exchange rates alone?
To answer this question, the growth rate of oil
prices was regressed on past growth rates of the
exchangerate. 10Chart3showsthe growth rate ofoil
prices andthe fitted values obtainedfromestimating
the equation over 1959Q2-1985Q4. The equation
tracks changes in the growth rate of oiL prices
reasonably well. Itreveals that oil prices wouldhave
been expected to increase over the periods(1973-74
and 1978-81 onthebasisoftherelationshipbetween
oil prices and exchange rates alone. Needlesstosay,
the equation does not explain the entire increase in
oil prices during those periods. The equation also
suggests that oil prices should have deCliriedbver
the period 1981-1985.
A common criticism of exercises ofthis. sort is
that the estimated equation has simply correlated
changes in the two variables. Consequently, while
such an equation provides a reasonable fitover the
sampleperiod, it is notlikelytoperformvery well in
explaining events beyond the period over which it
was estimated. To test this proposition, the same
equation was estimated from 1959Q2 to 1978Q4,
that is, up to the year before the second "oil
shock".11 The coefficients from this equation and
the actual values ofthe exchange rate from 1979Ql
Chart 3
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Fitted values obtained by regressing oil price on lags
of exchange rate only.
See footnote 10 for details.
32onwards were used to "predict" the price of oil
through the second quarter of 1986.
Chart 4A shows the results of this exercise; The
equation predicts increases in the price of oil
throughthe endof1981, anddecreases inthe price
ofoil through the first quarter of 1986. This pattern
is·consistent with the actual changes in oil prices
over this period, althoughthe equation does under-
predict the increases inthepre--1982 period (most
noticeably inthe first quarter of 1981) and predicts
sharper decreases irlthe price of oilthan actually
occurredin the three years afterward. The equation
Chart 4
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33also misses the large fall in oil prices in the second
quarter of 1986, when it predicts a small increase.
Chart4B transforms these results to express them
in terms of the level of oil prices. The predicted
va.llles track theactual price ofoilquitecloselyuntil
the fourth quarter of 1980, but miss the large
increase that took place in the first quarter of 1981.
Itis perhaps significant thatthe Iran-Iraq war began
in September 1980. The equation correctly predicts
declining oil prices from the third quarter of 1981
onwards, but a faster pace of decline than what
actually occurred. The large drop in oil prices that
took place over the first half of this year actually
brings oil prices back into line with those predicted
by the equation.
While these results should not be interpreted to
implythattheexchangerate is theonly variable that
matters for the price of oil, they do offer strong
evidence that the exchange rate is an important
determinantofoilprices. Since itis well-knownthat
theexchange rate itself is influenced by a host of
developments both in the V.S. and abroad, the
results implythatoilpricechangescannotalways be
regarded as exogenous to economic developments.
II. Oil Prices and Economic Activity
The results demonstrating that changes in the
exchange rate have a substantial effect on the price
of oil have, in tum, important implications for
studies that attempt to estimate the impact of oil
supply shocks on the V.S. economy. They imply,
first, that studies that omit exchange rates will
mismeasure the impact that oil supply shocks have
on the economy since some of the impact of
exchange rate changes will be attributed to oil price
changes. Second, they imply that it is incorrect to
use changes in the price of oil as a measure of the
underlying supply shock because some of these
price changes are caused by other factors. Thus,
studies that attempt to analyze the effects of oil
supply shocks mustfirst isolate the componentofoil
price changes thatis not due to these factors. Before
proceeding to an empirical examination of these
issues, we review the channels through which a
shock to the supply ofoil will affect the economy.
Effects of Oil Supply Shocks
Along with labor and capital, energy is an input
to theproductionprocess. Oil in tumis an important
component of total energy sources. An increase in
the priceofoil dueto an OPEC shock to supply will
force business firms to economize on the use ofoil.
Since close substitutes for oil are not readily avail-
able, this will leadto areduction inenergy input and
a consequent decline in aggregate supply.
There will be othereffects as well. Analysts have
often likened exogenous increases in the price ofoil
to a tax increase for consumers that leads to a
reduction in demand. An increase in the price ofoil
34
also redistributes income between the V .S. and the
rest ofthe world because the V.S. is a net importer
ofoil. Within industry, profits are redistributed from
oil-consuming to oil-producing firms.
The lasteffect reveals an aspect that is potentially
important when trying to determine the net impact
ofoil supply shocks on economy-wide output. Just
as oil consuming industries react to an exogenous
increase in the price of oil by reducing output,
industriesinvolved inthe productionofoil will react
by increasing output. They do sobecausethe higher
price of oil makes it profitable to engage in both
exploration and drilling for oil in locations where it
was previously unprofitable to do so. An increase in
the level ofactivity by firms directly engaged in the
productionofoil leads, intum, to increased produc-
tion in industriesthatsupplythesefirms withinputs.
Similarly, an exogenous decrease in the price ofoil
will force a contraction in the output of industries
involved in producing oil.
Thus, the overalleffectsofanyexogenous change
in the price of oil on real output will depend upon
the relative magnitude of the effects on the oil-
consuming and oil-producing sectors. While pre-
vious research has focused upon the impact of
exogenous oil price changes on oil-consuming sec-
tors of the economy, recent evidence suggests that
the impact upon the oil-producing sector may be
substantial as well. In particular, experience over
the short period since the oil price decline in early
1986 suggests that the immediate impact on oil
producers may be large enough to outweigh the
impilct on oil consumers.These considerations imply that using theory
alone to predict the exact response of aggregate
output to an exogenous change in the supply ofoil
would lead to a somewhat ambiguous answer. In
contrast, the effect on the•price.level. is •unam-
biguous. An exogenous reduction in the oil supply
leads to an increase in the priceafoil and in the
aggregate price level. (It is this increase in the price
ofailthat causes domestic oil producers to increase
their output.)
We have contendedthatthe omissionofexchange
rates will bias the measured impact that oil price
changes have on the economy. To see what the
precise effects will be, it is necessary to examine
what economic theory tells us about the impact of
exchange rate changes on the economy. Recall,
first, that the sample period of this study includes
two episodes of sharp increases in the price ofoil.
Oilprices almosttripledin 1973 and then again over
the 1979-81 period. As Chart 1 indicates, both
episodes were preceded by declines in the value of
the dollar. The proximity of these dollar declines
suggests that omitting the effects of the exchange
ratechanges wouldexaggeratethe effectofoilprice
shocks.
Forinstance, theory tells us thatan increase inthe
value of the dollar will lead to lower inflation. A
higher dollarimplies that the price ofU.S. imports
declines and that domestic producers must lower
prices on goods sold in the U.S. In addition, if
domestic producers are to remain competitive in
world markets, they must reduce export prices as
well. Similarly, when the dollar falls, the price of
imports goes up. In addition to the direct impact on
the price level, a decline in the dollar's value also
allows domestic producers to raise prices on prod-
ucts that compete with imports. For our purposes,
this implies thatignoring exchange rate effects will
lead oneto attribute the inflation that followed the
dollar'sdepreciation in both theearlyandlate 1970s
largely to the oilprice increases. 12
Empirical.Results
We nowtumto adiscussion ofthe formalempiri-
caltests. InTable2,weexaminewhetherchanges in
the price ofoil help predict changes in real output.
To isolate the role played by different variables, we
present a series ofVARs. The first VAR looks at the
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relationship between real GNP and the price ofoil
aloneandindicates that the priceofoil is extremely
significantin predicting real GNP. The reverse is
true as well, thatis, real GNP predicts the price of
oil..Similarly, in the systemconsisting ofoil prices
andthe GNPdeflator, both variables "cause"·each
other.·These conclusions hold up in the three-vari-
able system as well, although in not as strong a
form..The results reported in· theseVARson the
effect of oil prices on both real GNP and the price
level are essentially similar to what has been
reported in earlier studies.
To test our major hypothesis, we added the
exchangerate tothe VAR. The resultofthis addition
is that the price of oil is no longer significant at
conventional statistical levels in predicting real out-
put. This finding is consistent with our discussion
above since it demonstrates that the significance of
the measured impact of oil price changes on real
output depends on whether exchange. rates are
included in the VAR. While oil prices are still
significant in .predicting the GNP.det1ator, the
dynamic response functions show that theirimpact
is considerably smaller once exchange rates are
included. These results arediscussed below. Table 2
also reveals that both real GNP and the exchange
rate provide information about future values ofthe
price ofoil.
A problemin interpreting the results above is that
the dollar is a financial asset. Since financial mar-
kets react to new information much more rapidly
than goods markets, results from causality tests
often show that financial market variables have
considerable predictive power for other variables in
the model. (See Sims, 1982, for adiscussionofthis
issue and an example.) Thus, it is possible. that the
exchange rate is significant in the ;)hove equations
b¢cause it is "picking up" information aboutthe
future course ofevents in the economy.
InSection I, we showed that changesinthe value
ofthe dollar predict a reasonable p¢rcentageofthe
oil price increases in both 1973 and 1979.•This
result suggests that the relationship between the
dollarand oilprices is notdue tothe anticipation by
ass.et marketsofincreases in the priceofoilbecause
it is generally agreed that the dollar's depreciation
priorto both these.episodes was due to factors such
as the difference between.the policy stance of theUnited States and other industrialized countries.
As a formal test ofwhether the exchange rate is
falsely significant in the above equations, we
replaced the exchange rate by the Standard and
Poor's 500 stock price index in the VAR. The
changedoes not alterthe significanceofthe oil price
variable in the real GNP equation at all (that is, it
remains the same as in the three-variable VAR). Nor
does the stock price index predict changes in the
price ofoil. 13
As a final check, the last systemshown in Table 2
adds the Standard and Poor 500 stock index to the
VAR that also contains the exchange rate. If the
exchange rate were significant only because the
dollar is a financial asset, this experiment should
reduce its predictive power. Table 2 reveals that the
addition ofthe S&P index does not materially alter
the significance of the exchange rate. 14 Together,
the results from these tests suggest it is unlikely that
the exchange rate is significant in the VAR simply
because it is acting as a proxy for developments in
the financial market.
The different VARs reported above appear to
represent robust results. Slope dummies were used
in order to test for stability. For each variable on the
right-hand side ofagivenequation, anothervariable
was created that takes the value of that particular
variable up to 1973Q1 and zero after that. These
new variables were then included in all equations in
addition to the original variables.
36Ifthe relationships under study changed between
the periods 1959Q2-1973Q1and 1973Q2-1985Q4,
then including these variables would significantly
alter the pattern ofunpredicted changes in the vari-
ables (such as real GNP and oil prices) whose
behavior is being explained. The tests show that
there is no significant difference between the two
periods for either the five-variable system or the
four-variable system (which contains real GNP, the
GNP deflator, the exchange rate, and the oil price).
However, when theexchangerate isdroppedfrom
the VAR, the test reveals a significant difference
between the two periods. Asecondtest involving an
examination ofthe individual equations shows that
the source of this difference lies in the oil price
equation. This finding implies that there is a signifi-
cant difference in unpredictable oil price changes
between the two periods if exchange rates are
excluded from the oil price equation but not when
they are included.!S
We now examine the responses ofoutput and the
price level to an oil price shock. Chart 5 shows how
the responses ofboth these variables change when
the exchange rate is included in the system. In the
left-hand panel, we show that the effect of an
increase in the price of oil on the GNP deflator
becomes noticeably smalleronce the exchange rate
is included in.the VAR. In particular, including the
exchangerate •.reduces both.the magnitude of the
initial impact and the duration of the effect. The
response ofreal GNP to an oil price shock changes
in a similarmanner. That is, includingthe exchange
rate in theVAR reduces boththe size as well as the
duration of the real GNP response to an oil price
shock. (Notice also that in the system excluding the
exchange rate, an oil priceshockleads to acontem-
poraneous increase in real GNP. This anomaly is
removed when the exchange rate is added to the
system.)
It is interesting to examine the implications of
these results for specific episodes such as the
1973-1975 period ofoil price increases. Using two
of the VARs shown in Table 2, we examine the
impact on real GNP.
Chart 6A shows the forecasts we would have
made using the three-variable system containing
real GNP, the GNPdeflator, and the priceofoilwith











Dynamic Effects of an Increase in the Price of Oil
(Obtained from VARs in Table 2)
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A. Forecasts From the Three-Variable VAR
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38using data up to 1985Q4. The line labeled "Pure
Forecast" is the real GNP we would have predicted
before any datafor 1973 becameavailable. The line
labeled "PureForecast Plus Oil"adds the effects of
the oil priceshocks.. We see that includingthe oil
price shocks improves the forecast, .1ll0st notice-
ably during the fourth quarter of 1974 and the first
quarter of 1975 whenreal GNP was contracting.
Chart6Bshowstheresults from asimilarexercise
using the four-variable system consisting of real
GNP, the GNP deflator, the price of oil, and the
exchange rate. The line labeled "Pure Forecast Plus
Oil" shows whatwe wouldhavepredictedattheend
of 1972 had we known the behavior of oil prices
over the next two years. The continuous line is
reproduced from Chart 6A for comparison. Com-
paring the two lines reveals that the effect ofthe oil
price shock on real GNP growth is smaller in the
four-variable system, most noticeably in the first
quarter of 1975. The smaller impact is due to
unpredictable exchange rate changes, captured in
the line labeled "Pure Forecast Plus Exchange
Rate." This outcome supports our contention that
omitting the exchange rate will cause the. effect of
exchange rate changes to beattributedto changes in
the price ofoil.
To obtain an idea of how much of the total
variationin.both realGNP and the price level over
the.entire sample period is due to oil price sho(':ks,
considertheresultsshowninTables 3and4.Table3
shows the results for real GNP. Once again, we first
consider a system consisting.ofonly real GNP.and
the price of oil and successively add the GNP
deflator and the exchange rate.
While disturbances to the price of oil have a
relatively largeimpactonrealGNPwhenonlythese
two variables are included in the VAR, the addition
ofother variables noticeably reduces their explana-
tory power. The results for theGNPdeflatorinTable
4 tell a similar story. Oil price disturbances do
account for a relatively large percentage of the
variance of the error made in predicting the GNP
deflator in the first two systems. However, adding
the exchange rate lowers their relative importance.
The results reported here maximize the role
played by oil price shocks because only oil price
39shocks are allowed to affect everything else in the
VAR contemporaneously. Removing the restriction
on other variables noticeably reduces the response
ofbothreal GNPandthe deflatortooilpriceshocks,
especially when the exchange rate is included in the
VAR. The effects of an oil price shock are also
susceptible to an increase in the lag length used in
the VAR. For instance, an increase in the numberof
lags in the VAR from 4 to 8 causes the real GNP
response to an oil price shock to become even
40
smaller (while the real GNP response to an
exchange rate shock becomes somewhat larger). 16
Finally, while the results are not shown, distur-
bances.to the. exchange rate account fora relatively
large proportion of the variance of the oil price
forecast error in the larger systems as well. For
example, in the four-variable system, thepercentage
of. the oil price forecast error variance due to
exchange rate disturbances is 38 at the ten-quarter
horizon and 40 at the twenty-quarter horizon. 17m. Interpretation and Conclusions
The empirical results in Section I above demon-
strate that changes in the value of the dollar have a
substantial impact upon the dollar price of oil.
However, we must emphasize that the estimated
equations do not explain all the variation in oil
prices over the period studied. The results do not
imply that OPEC was unable to increase oil prices
above what they otherwise would have been. They
do suggest that the dollar price of oil would have
risen in the 1970s as the dollar depreciated and
would have fallen in the 1980s as the dollarappreci-
ated even without the existence of OPEC. This
contradicts the common view that changes in the
price of oil are generally exogenous. Such a view
may have resulted from an excessive focus on the
role ofOPEC in setting oil prices and the beliefthat
OPEC's decisions are made independently of eco-
nomic developments.
The analysis suggests that a considerable propor-
tion ofthe changes in the price ofoil during the so-
called oil price shocks were simply discontinuous
price adjustments to changes in the economic
environment. This discontinuity is probably the
result of the cartel's mode of operation, which has
been one of making large adjustments in output
while adhering to a pre-announced dollar price.
Ofparticular interest in this context was the steep
fall in oil prices in early 1986. While disagreements
within the cartel were the proximate cause of the
large decline in prices, it is likely that the apprecia-
tion ofthe dollar until early 1985 played an impor-
tant part. The appreciating dollar tended to reduce
non-U.S. demand for oil while increasing supply
from countries other than OPEC. Since OPEC was
trying to maintain a constant dollar price of oil, it
was forced to make large reductions in output.
Disagreementsabouthow these reductions inoutput
were to be allocated led to a collapse in OPEC's
agreements. In all likelihood, the output reductions
forced upon the cartel would have been smaller in
the absence ofthe dollar's appreciation.
Viewed differently, the evidence (especially
Chart 4) suggests that, during the early 1980s, the
cartel succeeded in keeping prices above what the
historical relationship between exchange rates and
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oil prices would suggest. However, pressures that
arose from doingso led to abreakdownofthe cartel.
The large oil price decline in early 1986 then
brought prices back to more "normal" levels.
While our analysis ignores otherfactors that may
affect the priceofoil, ourinterpretationis consistent
with the behavior of other commodity prices. In
general, commodity prices have been declining
since the dollar began to appreciate. Were it not for
the cartel, oil prices probably would have declined
significantly more prior to 1986.
The relationship between oil prices and the value
ofthe dollar is the basis for questioning studies that
purportedly measure the impact ofoil price shocks
on the economy while ignoring either the impact of
the exchange rate on the price ofoil orthe impactof
the exchange rate on the economy. In Section II, we
demonstrated that once the exchange rate is taken
into account, changes in the price of oil no longer
have a significant impactonreal GNP. An examina-
tion of the 1973 "oil shock" episode also reveals
that omitting the exchange rate exaggerates the
contraction in real GNP following the oil price
increase. Furthermore, the results inTable 3 suggest
that output variations induced by oil price changes
have not constituted a large proportion ofthe total
variation in real output over the sample period as a
whole. Taken together, this evidence suggests that
the large decline in oil prices in the beginning of
1986 is not likely to provide as big a boost to real
GNP as would be predicted on the basis ofprevious
studies.
Finally, the results in Section II also show that
inclusion of the exchange rate in the VAR reduces
the impact of changes in the oil price on the GNP
deflator. Most noticeable is the reduction in the
length oftime for which oil price changes continue
to have an effect on the price level. Apparently, the
effectofoil pricechanges is concentratedin the first
few quarters following an oil price shock. This
finding reinforces our point that omitting the
exchange rate causesthe oilpricevariableto pickup
the inflation that may actually have been due to the
dollar's depreciation.FOOTNOTES
1. Structural models that take the exchange rate into
account when studying the effects of oil shocks on the
economy assume that the price of oil is determined
exogenously (which is halfway between including and
excluding exchange rates in the corresponding VAR). An
exception is Hooper and Lowrey (1979), which studies the
impact of exchange rate changes under two alternative
assumptions: first, that exchange rate changes have no
impact on the price of oil, and second, that half of the oil
price increase in 1979was dueto the fall in the value of the
dollar.
2. In view of the results to follow, it is interesting that he
found that the price of imports (which reflects the value of
the dollar) had a significant impact on the price of oil and
yet dismissed the finding as inconsequential.
3. Gisser and Goodwin (1986) build upon the
"exogeneity" results of Hamilton, and use the price of oil in
a reduced form, St. Louis-type equation to show that the
price of oil affects output, inflation, etc.
4. Oil exporters will be indifferent to changes in the value
of the dollar only if the entire proceeds from the sale of oil
are used to purchase dollar-denominated products a
condition that is hardly likely to be satisfied in practice.
5. An exchange rate index for the dollar measures the
value of the dollar against a weighted average of a basket
of currencies. A multilateral trade-weighted index uses the
ratio of a country's total trade (exports plus imports) to the
total trade of all countries in the basket as weights.
6. It appears that alternative dollar indices will move
togetheras long as changes in these indicesoriginatefrom
changes in the value ofthe dollar. However, the indices will
move differently if non-dollar currency realignments tend
to be larger or more common. For our purposes, it is
probably sufficient that the dollar depreciation during the
early, as well as late 1970s, was not accompanied by large
changes in the value of nondollar currencies against each
other.
See Brown and Phillips (1986) for a study that uses oil
consumption weights to construct an index for the dollar.
They show that an increase in the value of the dollar leads
to a decline in the dollar price of Saudi Arabian oil.
7. Sample size and data frequency were dictated by the
availability of exchange rate data. Data on the Federal
Reserve Board's trade-weighted exchange rate is avail-
able in quarterly average form starting in 1956.
All variables are included as the first difference of logs. All
VARs include a constant and a time trend. Lag lengths
were chosen as follows. I started with a specification of 12
lags. A likelihood ratio test was then used to compare this
with lag lengths of 4, 8 and 16 lags. (The test used is
discussed in Sims 1980, and includes a correction for the
numberof explanatory variables in each equation.) For the
VAR containing the price ofoil and the exchange rate, the
tests reveal that the 12-lag specification is different from
the 4- and 8-lag specifications at the 1 percent level, but is
no different from the 16-lag specification. The lag of 12
quarters implies that estimation begins from 195902. To
keep the results comparable, all other VARs are estimated
over the same period, even though each of them contains
only four lags o/each variable.
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8. The moving average representations and the variance
decompositions shown here- and in the rest of the paper
- have all been obtained by placing oil prices first and
exchange rates last in the ordering imposed uponthe error
terms. In other words, it is assumed that any shock com-
mon to oil prices and other variables in the VAR is due
entirely to a change in oil prices. This ordering will, in
general, maximize the role played by oil price shocks and
minimize that of exchange rate shocks.
9. Placing exchange rates first in the ordering substan-
tially increases the effect of exchange rate disturbances.
Exchange rate shocks account for 33 percent of the fore-
cast error variance of oil prices at the 5-quarter horizon, 51
percentalthe1O-quarter horizon, and 54 percent althe20-
quarter horizon. The effect of oil price shocks becomes
correspondingly and noticeably smaller. Oil prices shocks
account for 5 percent of the forecast error variance of
exchange rates at the 5-quarter horizon, 11 percent at the
1O-quarter horizon, and 11 percent at the 20-quarter hori-
zon.
10. The first difference of the log of the price of oil is
regressed on 12 lags of the first difference of the log of the
exchange rate. The equation also contains a constant and
atime trend. The R2 for the equation is .48, the adjusted R2
is .41. The Standard Error is .041, and the Durbin-Watson
statistic is 1.66.
11. The R2 from this exercise is .47, the adjusted R2 is .37.
The Standard Error of the equation is .034 and the OW.
statistic is 1.86.
12. Theory also tells us that a fall in the value of the dollar
will lead to an increase in output. However, the empirical
results indicate that this increase is only temporary and
that it is followed by a contraction in real output.
While this result is counterintuitive, it has been reported by
other researchers as well. Simulations with the Board of
Governors MPS model suggestthat afall in the value ofthe
dollarfirst raises real output butthen reduces it, so that two
years later, the level of real GNP is below its initial level. An
important assumption in their simulation is that monetary
policy remains unchanged. In our analysis, the results are
notsignificantly altered when the money supply is included
in the VAR.
13. When the S&P 500 is included (and the exchange rate
dropped from the VAR), the oil price has a marginal
significance level (M.S.L.) of .06 in the real GNP equation,
which is the same as when the VAR containsonly real GNP,
the real GNP deflator, and the priceofoil. The S&P 500 has
a M.S.L. of .11 in the oil price equation, .81 in the GNP
deflator equation, and .02 in the real GNP equation. In the
variance decompositions, the S&P 500 accounts for no
morethan (a) 7 percentofthe forecasterrorvariance of the
oil price; (b) 4 percentof the forecast error variance of the
GNP deflator, and (c) 10 percent of the variance of real
GNP, at forecast horizons up to 20 quarters.
14. The variance decompositions reveal that the share of
forecast error variances explained by the S&P 500 is no
more than 4 percent for oil prices, 4 percent for the GNP
deflator, and 9 percent for real GNP at any forecast hori-
zon. Inclusion ofeitherthe 1O-year or the 20-yearTreasury
bond rate also does not alter the significance levels of theexchange rate in the VAR, although the long rates do
explain a considerable proportion of the GNP deflator's
forecast error variance, Finally, the nature of the results is
unaffected by the inclusion of M1 in the VAR.
15, For the system stability tests, a likelihood ratio test,
discussed in Sims (1980), was used, F,testswere carried
out on the individual equations, For the 5,variable system
in Table 2, the Chi,square statistic - calculated under the
null hypothesis of no change between the two periods -
had a marginal significance level of ,85, For the 4-variable
system, the computed Chi-square has a marginal signifi-
cance level of A1, Finally, for the 3-variable system, the
test statistic has a marginal significance level of ,02, In this
system, the oil priceequation has aF(12,81) statistic of 2,5,
which is significant at 5 percent
16, The effect of increasing the lag length is especially
noticeable in an examination of the 1973 "oil shock" epi-
sode, While the impact of the change in oil prices in the
3-variable VAR is more or less the same in both the 4 and 8
lag versions, it becomes much smaller once the exchange
rate is included, Specifically, knowledge of the oil price
shocks does not appearto be useful in "predicting" much
of the decline in real GNP over 197403-197501,
17, To test the robustness of this result with respect to
other output and inflation measures, a system containing
industrial production and the producer price index was
also estimated, While the oil price is significant at less than
one percent in the industrial production equation when
only oil prices and industrial production are included, its
marginal significance level increasesto,76 when both the
producer price index and the exchange rate are added to
the system,
In the variance decompositions, the oil price variable
accounts for a maximum of 6 percent of the forecast error
variance of industrial production even when it is placed
first (in a four-variable VAR which included the exchange
rate), With oil prices placed last, this number falls to 4
percent In the same system, oil prices (when placed first)
account for 13 percent of the variance of the error in
predicting producer prices in the contemporaneous quar-
ter. This falls to 8 percent at the ten-quarter horizon, When
oil prices are placed last, they account for more than 5
percent of the forecast error variance of the PPI only once,
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